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Abstract
In this paper we will consider a generalized extension of the Eisenberg-Noe model of finan-
cial contagion to allow for time dynamics in both discrete and continuous time. Derivation and
interpretation of the financial implications will be provided. Emphasis will be placed on the
continuous-time framework and its formulation as a differential equation driven by the oper-
ating cash flows. Mathematical results on existence and uniqueness of firm wealths under the
discrete and continuous-time models will be provided. Finally, the financial implications of time
dynamics will be considered. The focus will be on how the dynamic clearing solutions differ
from those of the static Eisenberg-Noe model.
Keywords: Systemic risk; financial contagion; financial network; dynamic network
1 Introduction
Financial networks and the contagion of bank failures have been widely studied beginning with
the seminal work on financial payment networks by Eisenberg & Noe [14]. The 2007-2009
financial crisis and credit crunch showed the severe impacts that systemic crises can have on
the financial sector and the economy as a whole. As the costs of such cascading events is
tremendous, the modeling of such events is imperative. Recently there have been significant
studies on modeling financial systemic risk and financial contagion. Two major classes of models
exist for systemic risk, i.e., those based on network models from [14] and those based on a mean
field approach [25, 10]. Notably, the network model approach generally is considered in only a
static, single time, setting while the mean field approach is considered as a differential system.
In this paper we will construct a dynamic extension of the interbank network model of [14] thus
closing the gap between these two streams of literature.
Interbank networks were studied first in [14] to model the spread of defaults in the finan-
cial system. In the Eisenberg-Noe framework, financial firms must satisfy their liabilities by
transferring assets. One firm being unable to meet its liabilities due to a shortfall of assets
can cause other firms to default on some of their liabilities as well, causing a cascading fail-
ure in the financial system. The existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments of this
baseline model was proven in [14]. That paper additionally provides methods for numerically
computing the realized interbank payments. This baseline model has been extended in multiple
directions, including bankruptcy costs, cross-holdings, and fire sales. We refer to [44, 41] for
reviews of the prior literature. In regards to bankruptcy costs in financial networks, we refer
to [16, 37, 15, 30, 44, 8, 43]. Cross-holdings have been studied in [16, 15, 44, 31]. Fire sales
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for a single (representative) illiquid asset have been studied in [12, 35, 27, 2, 11, 44, 1] and for
multiple illiquid assets in [18, 20, 19]. These network models have been implemented by central
banks and regulators for stress testing of and studying cascading failures in the banking systems
under their jurisdiction, see, e.g., [3, 32, 6, 17, 42, 26].
Mean field models have also been considered for studying financial contagion and systemic
risk. [25] provides a model of agents who revert to the ensemble mean to provide understanding
of “systemic risk events” in which many firms fail. Similar mean field diffusion models without
controls were studied in, e.g., [24, 28, 29]. In contrast, mean field and stochastic games have
been proposed for the study of systemic risk in, e.g., [10, 9]. In such models the firms are allowed
to borrow from (or lend to) a central bank, the amount of which is optimized to minimize a
quadratic cost function. Thus the choice of borrowing and lending provides an optimal control
problem beyond the simpler mean field model of [25]. [34] proposes a separate particle system
model with mean field interactions.
The current work will focus on adding the time dynamics, which make the mean field mod-
els attractive, to the interbank network approach. In fact, the conclusion of [14] provides a
discussion of future extensions, one of which is the inclusion of multiple clearing dates. This
has been studied directly in [7, 23]. Additionally, [33] considers a similar approach to model
financial networks with multiple maturities. [19] further provides another approach to financial
networks with multiple maturities by considering each clearing date as a different asset. All of
these works, however, only consider clearing at discrete times. [40] presents a continuous-time
clearing model that exactly replicates the static Eisenberg-Noe framework. In this work we will
present both discrete and continuous-time clearing models. However, our emphasis will be on
the derivation and the characterization of the continuous-time model. This in part is motivated
by the prospect of unification with the mean-field models as well as traditional financial mod-
els which typically employ continuous-time models. Additionally, as we will demonstrate, the
continuous-time framework no longer requires monotonicity for existence and uniqueness which
is generally assumed for static and discrete-time systems. This is valuable for future works
that may model network formation and payments as a non-cooperative game; such games may
not satisfy the strong monotonicity assumptions usually considered in static and discrete-time
systems, but would likely satisfy the sufficient conditions for the continuous-time framework.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we will provide a review of the
static Eisenberg-Noe framework. Of particular interest, in this section, we consider the clearing
to be in terms of the equity and losses of the firms, as considered in, e.g., [43, 5] rather than
payments as originally studied in [14]. In Section 3 we propose a discrete-time formulation for
the Eisenberg-Noe model. In discrete time we provide results on existence and uniqueness, as
well as a numerical algorithm based on the fictitious default algorithm of [14]. We then extend
our model to a continuous-time setting in Section 4. For continuous time we consider existence
and uniqueness of the clearing solutions, and a numerical algorithm for finding sample paths
of this clearing solution, under cash flows modeled by Itô processes. We additionally provide
conditions for the discrete-time setting to converge to the continuous-time solution as the time
step limits to 0. Section 5 provides discussion on the financial implications of time dynamics in
interbank networks. In particular, we find that the static Eisenberg-Noe clearing solution can
be recovered in the continuous-time setting by choosing the network parameters precisely. This
allows for a notion of determining the true order of defaults as opposed to the fictitious default
order discussed in the static literature based on [14]. However, if the continuous-time network
parameters are determined to not follow the rules for recreating the static Eisenberg-Noe setting,
then the dynamic and static clearing solutions will generally not coincide. In fact, the set of
defaulting and solvent institutions can be altered by rearranging the timing of obligations. As
such, using the static Eisenberg-Noe framework for stress testing may result in an incorrect
assessment of the health of the financial system. The proofs of the main results are provided in
the Appendix.
2
2 Static clearing systems
We begin with some simple notation that will be consistent for the entirety of this paper. Let
x, y ∈ Rn for some positive integer n, then
x ∧ y = (min(x1, y1),min(x2, y2), . . . ,min(xn, yn))⊤ ,
x− = −(x ∧ 0), and x+ = (−x)−. Further, to ease notation, we will denote [x, y] := [x1, y1] ×
[x2, y2]× . . .× [xn, yn] ⊆ Rn to be the n-dimensional compact interval for y−x ∈ Rn+. Similarly,
we will consider x ≤ y if and only if y − x ∈ Rn+.
Throughout this paper we will consider a network of n financial institutions. We will denote
the set of all banks in the network by N := {1, 2, . . . , n}. Often we will consider an additional
node 0, which encompasses the entirety of the financial system outside of the n banks; this node
0 will also be referred to as society or the societal node. The full set of institutions, including
the societal node, is denoted by N0 := N ∪ {0}. We refer to [22, 30] for further discussion of
the meaning and concepts behind the societal node.
We will be extending the model from [14] in this paper. In that work, any bank i ∈ N may
have obligations Lij ≥ 0 to any other firm or society j ∈ N0. We will assume that no firm has
any obligations to itself, i.e., Lii = 0 for all firms i ∈ N , and the society node has no liabilities
at all, i.e., L0j = 0 for all firms j ∈ N0. Thus the total liabilities for bank i ∈ N is given
by p¯i :=
∑
j∈N0
Lij ≥ 0 and relative liabilities πij := Lijp¯i if p¯i > 0 and arbitrary otherwise;
for simplicity, in the case that p¯i = 0, we will let πij =
1
n for all j ∈ N0\{i} and πii = 0 to
retain the property that
∑
j∈N0
πij = 1. On the other side of the balance sheet, all firms are
assumed to begin with some amount of external assets xi ≥ 0 for all firms i ∈ N0. The resultant
clearing payments, under a no priority of payments assumption, satisfy the fixed point problem
in payments p ∈ [0, p¯]
p = p¯ ∧ (x+Π⊤p) . (1)
That is, each bank pays the minimum of what it owes (p¯i) and what it has (xi +
∑
j∈N πjipj).
The resultant vector of wealths for all firms is given by
V = x+Π⊤p− p¯. (2)
Noting that payments can be written as a simple function of the wealths (p = p¯ − V −), we
provide the following proposition. We refer also to [43, 5, 4] for similar notions of utilizing
clearing wealth instead of clearing payments.
Proposition 2.1. A vector p ∈ [0, p¯] is a clearing payments in the Eisenberg-Noe setting (1) if
and only if p = [p¯− V −]+ for some V ∈ Rn+1 satisfying the following fixed point problem
V = x+Π⊤[p¯− V −]+ − p¯. (3)
Vice versa, a vector V ∈ Rn+1 is a clearing wealths (i.e., satisfying (3)) if and only if V is
defined as in (2) for some clearing payments p ∈ [0, p¯] as defined in the fixed point problem (1).
Proof. We will prove the first equivalence only, the second follows similarly.
Let p ∈ [0, p¯] be a clearing payment vector. Define the wealth vector V by (2), then it is
clear that V − = p¯− p by definition as well, i.e., p = p¯−V − ≥ 0. Thus from (2) we immediately
recover that the wealth vector V must satisfy (3).
Let p = [p¯− V −]+ for some wealth vector V ∈ Rn+1 satisfying (3). By construction we find
p = [p¯− V −]+ = p¯− (x+Π⊤[p¯− V −]+ − p¯)− = p¯− (x+Π⊤p− p¯)− = p¯ ∧ (x+Π⊤p) .
We note that p¯ ≥ (x+Π⊤[p¯− V −]+ − p¯)− can be shown trivially.
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Due to the equivalence of the clearing payments and clearing wealths provided in Proposi-
tion 2.1, we are able to consider the Eisenberg-Noe system as a fixed point of equity and losses
rather than payments. In [14] results for the existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments
(and thus for the clearing wealths as well) are provided. In fact, it can be shown that there
exists a unique clearing solution in the Eisenberg-Noe framework so long as Li0 > 0 for all firms
i ∈ N . We will take advantage of this result later in this paper. This is a reasonable assumption
(as discussed in, e.g., [30]) as obligations to society include, e.g., deposits to the banks.
3 Discrete-time clearing systems
Consider now a discrete set of clearing times T, e.g., T = {0, 1, . . . , T } for some (finite) terminal
time T < ∞ or T = N. Such a setting is presented in [7]. For processes we will use the
notation from [13] such that the process Z : T→ Rn has value of Z(t) at time t ∈ T and history
Zt := (Z(s))
t
s=0.
In this setting, we will consider the external (incoming) cash flow x : T→ Rn+1+ and nominal
liabilities L : T→ R(n+1)×(n+1)+ to be functions of the clearing time, i.e., as assets and liabilities
with different maturities. The external cash in-flows and nominal liabilities can explicitly depend
on the clearing results of the prior times (i.e., x(t, Vt−1) and L(t, Vt−1)) without affecting the
existence and uniqueness results we present, but for simplicity of notation we will focus on the
case where the external assets and nominal liabilities are independent of the health and wealth
of the firms. Throughout we are considering the discounted cash flows and liabilities so as to
simplify notation.
In contrast to the static Eisenberg-Noe framework, herein we need to consider the results
of the prior times. In particular, if firm i has positive equity at time t − 1 (i.e., Vi(t − 1) > 0)
then these additional assets are available to firm i at time t in order to satisfy its obligations.
Similarly, if firm i has negative wealth at time t − 1 (i.e., Vi(t − 1) < 0) then the debts that
the firm has not yet paid will roll-forward in time and be due at the next period. For example,
consider a network in which obligations come due throughout the day at, e.g., opening, mid-day,
and closing, but that all debts must be cleared by the end of the day. In such a way, the current
unpaid liabilities may be paid at a future time, but before the terminal time. That is, a firm
can be considered in distress at a time if it is unable to satisfy its obligations at that time, but
only defaults if it has negative wealth at the terminal time. Thus in this paper we primarily
focus on the intra-day dynamics rather than the inter-day dynamics. See Figure 1b for a stylized
(snapshot of the) balance sheet example for a firm that has positive wealth at time 0 that rolls
forward to time 1. The full (actualized) balance sheet for this example with only those two
time periods is displayed in Figure 1a; we note that the full balance sheet as depicted considers
actualized payments rather than the book value of the obligations.
Remark 3.1. To incorporate the inter-day dynamics in this framework we can “zero out” a
firm before the terminal date if it is deemed to default in much the same as in [4]. A broader
framework for dealing with various default mechanisms is discussed in Remark 3.7. We can
further consider the Nash game in which firms decide if they will allow debts to be rolled
forward in time. In such a setting, if we include a delay for payment due to, e.g., bankruptcy
court so that defaulting firms do not pay any obligations until after the terminal time T , then
the optimal strategy for all firms (up until the terminal time T ) would be to always allow other
firms to roll all debts forward so as to maximize payments.
Assumption 3.2. Before the time of interest, all firms are solvent and liquid. That is, Vi(−1) ≥
0 for all firms i ∈ N0.
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Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Cash-Flow @ t = 0
xi(0)
Cash-Flow @ t = 1
xi(1)
Interbank @ t = 0∑n
j=1 πji(0)pj(0)
Interbank @ t = 1∑n
j=1 πji(1)pj(1)
Cash-Flow @ t = 0∑n
j=1Lij(0)
Cash-Flow @ t = 1∑n
j=1Lij(1)
Capital
Vi(1)
(a) Stylized actualized balance sheet for firm i with two time periods.
Balance Sheet @ t = 0
Assets Liabilities
Cash-Flow
xi(0)
Interbank∑n
j=1 πji(0)pj(0)
Cash-Flow∑n
j=1Lij(0)
Capital
Vi(0)
Balance Sheet @ t = 1
Assets Liabilities
Cash-Flow
xi(1)
Carry-Forward
Vi(0)
+
Interbank∑n
j=1 πji(1)pj(1)
Cash-Flow∑n
j=1Lij(1)
Carry-Forward
Vi(0)
− = 0
Capital
Vi(1)
(b) Stylized “snapshot” of actualized balance sheet for firm i at times 0 and 1.
Figure 1: Comparison of the full balance sheet to the snapshot of maturities utilized for Section 3.
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We can now construct the total liabilities and relative liabilities at time t ∈ T as
p¯i(t, Vt−1) :=
∑
j∈N0
Lij(t) + Vi(t− 1)−
πij(t, Vt−1) :=


Lij(t)+πij(t−1,Vt−2)Vi(t−1)
−
p¯i(t,Vt−1)
if p¯i(t, Vt−1) > 0
1
n if p¯i(t, Vt−1) = 0, j 6= i
0 if p¯i(t, Vt−1) = 0, j = i
∀i, j ∈ N0.
In this way, coupled with the accumulation of positive equity over time, the clearing wealths
must satisfy the following fixed point problem in time t wealths:
V (t) = V (t− 1)+ + x(t) + Π(t, Vt−1)⊤
[
p¯(t, Vt−1)− V (t)−
]+ − p¯(t, Vt−1). (4)
That is, all firms have a clearing wealth that is the summation of their positive equity at the
prior time, the new incoming external cash flow, and the payments made by all other firms
minus the total obligations of the firm (including the prior unpaid liabilities). In this way we
can construct the wealths of firms forward in time. This can be considered a discrete-time
extension of (3).
We now wish to consider a reformulation of (4). To accomplish this, we consider a process
of cash flows c and functional relative exposures A. These we define by
c(t) := x(t) + L(t)⊤~1− L(t)~1
aij(t, Vt) :=
{
πij(t, Vt−1) if p¯i(t, Vt−1) ≥ Vi(t)−
Lij(t)+πij(t−1,Vt−2)Vi(t−1)
−
Vi(t)−
if p¯i(t, Vt−1) < Vi(t)
−
∀i, j ∈ N0. (5)
In the above, ~1 := (1, 1, . . . , 1)⊤ ∈ Rn is the vector of ones. Here we consider c(t) = x(t) +
L(t)⊤~1−L(t)~1 ∈ Rn+1 to be the vector of book capital levels at time t, i.e., the new wealth of each
firm assuming all other firms pay in full. We wish to note that the new total liabilities are given
by L(t)~1 and the new incoming interbank obligations are given by L(t)⊤~1. We can also consider
ci(t) to be the net cash flow for firm i at time t. Further, we introduce the functional matrix
A : T × Rn+1 → [0, 1](n+1)×(n+1) to be the relative exposure matrix. That is, aij(t, Vt)Vi(t)−
provides the (negative) impact that firm i’s losses have on firm j’s wealth at time t ∈ T. This is
in contrast to Π, the relative liabilities, in that it endogenously imposes the limited exposures
concept. In this work the two notions will generally coincide, but for mathematical simplicity
we introduce this relative exposure matrix. For the equivalence we seek, we define the relative
exposures so that
L(t)⊤~1 +A(t− 1, Vt−1)⊤V (t− 1)− −A(t, Vt)⊤V (t)− = Π(t, Vt−1)⊤[p¯(t, Vt−1)− V (t)−]+
for any V (t) ∈ Rn+1. This formulation is such that if the positive part were removed from the
right hand side, the relative exposures A would be defined exactly as the relative liabilities Π
by construction. In particular, we will define the relative exposures element-wise and pointwise
so as to encompass the limited exposures as in (5). If p¯i(t, Vt−1) > 0 then we can simplify this
further as aij(t, Vt) =
Lij(t)+aij(t−1,Vt−1)Vi(t−1)
−
max{p¯i(t,Vt−1),Vi(t)−}
.
Using the notation and terms above we can rewrite (4) with respect to the cash flows c and
relative exposures A as
V (t) = V (t− 1)+ + x(t) + Π(t, Vt−1)⊤[p¯(t, Vt−1)− V (t)−]+ − p¯(t, Vt−1)
= V (t− 1)+ + x(t) + L(t)⊤~1 +A(t− 1, Vt−1)⊤V (t− 1)−
−A(t, Vt)⊤V (t)− − L(t)~1− V (t− 1)−
= V (t− 1) + x(t) + L(t)⊤~1 +A(t− 1, Vt−1)⊤V (t− 1)− −A(t, Vt)⊤V (t)− − L(t)~1
= V (t− 1) + c(t)−A(t, Vt)⊤V (t)− +A(t− 1, Vt)⊤V (t− 1)−. (6)
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For the remainder of this paper we will utilize the cash flow c rather than the external (incoming)
cash flow x. That is, we will consider financial networks defined by the joint parameters (c, L)
as given by the state equations (6) and (5) for wealths and relative exposures.
With this setup we now wish to extend the existence and uniqueness results of [14] to discrete
time.
Theorem 3.3. Let (c, L) : T→ Rn+1 × R(n+1)×(n+1)+ define a dynamic financial network such
that every bank has cash flow at least at the level dictated by nominal interbank liabilities, i.e.,
ci(t) ≥
∑
j∈N Lji(t) −
∑
j∈N0
Lij(t), and so that every bank owes to the societal node at all
times t ∈ T, i.e., Li0(t) > 0 for all banks i ∈ N and times t ∈ T. Under Assumption 3.2, there
exists a unique solution of clearing wealths V : T→ Rn+1 to (6).
Remark 3.4. The assumption that all firms have obligations to the societal node 0 at all times
t ∈ T guarantees that the financial system is a “regular network” (see [14, Definition 5]) at all
times.
The analysis of the discrete-time framework can be extended to a probabilistic setting over
the filtered probability space (Ω,F , (F(t))t∈T,P). That is, we can consider the clearing wealths
in the same manner assuming the cash flow c : T × Ω → Rn+1 and nominal liabilities L :
T × Ω → R(n+1)×(n+1)+ be adapted processes. Let L0t (Rm) be the space of Ft-measurable
random vectors in Rm. Let Lpt (Rm) ⊆ L0t (Rm) for p ∈ (0,∞] be the space of equivalence classes
of Ft-measurable functions X : Ω→ Rm such that ‖X‖p :=
(∫
Ω
√∑m
k=1Xk(ω)
2dP
)1/p
<∞ for
p < ∞ and ‖X‖∞ := ess supω∈Ω
√∑m
k=1Xk(ω)
2 for p = ∞. The following corollary considers
the boundedness and measurability properties of the discrete-time clearing wealths. Though
we will not utilize this discrete-time result in this paper, we consider it important to discuss
random events to more closely match reality. Further, this result will implicitly appear in the
construction and analysis of the continuous-time Eisenberg-Noe formulation of the next section.
Corollary 3.5. Consider the setting of Theorem 3.3 where the random network parameters
(c, L) adapted to the filtered probability space (Ω,F , (F(t))t∈T,P). If c(s) ∈ Lps(Rn+1) and
L(s) ∈ Lps(R(n+1)×(n+1)+ ) for all times s ≤ t for some p ∈ [0,∞], then the unique clearing
solution at time t has finite p-norm, i.e., V (t) ∈ Lpt (Rn+1).
With the construction of the existence and uniqueness of the solution we now want to
emphasize the fictitious default algorithm from [14] to construct this clearing wealths vector
over time. This algorithm is presented for the deterministic setting; if a stochastic setting is
desired then Algorithm 3.6 provides a method for computing a single sample path. We note
that at each time t this algorithm takes at most n iterations. Thus with a terminal time T , this
algorithm will construct the full clearing solution over T in nT iterations.
Algorithm 3.6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.3 in a deterministic setting the clearing
wealths process V : T → Rn+1 can be found by the following algorithm. Initialize t = −1 and
V (−1) ≥ 0 as a given. Repeat until t = maxT:
(i) Increment t = t+ 1.
(ii) Initialize k = 0, V 0 = V (t− 1) + c(t), and D0 = ∅. Repeat until convergence:
(a) Increment k = k + 1;
(b) Denote the set of insolvent banks by Dk :=
{
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} | V k−1i < 0
}
.
(c) If Dk = Dk−1 then terminate and set V (t) = V k−1.
(d) Define the matrix Λk ∈ {0, 1}n×n so that Λkij =
{
1 if i = j ∈ Dk
0 else
.
(e) Define V k = (I −Π(t, Vt−1)⊤Λk)−1
(
V (t− 1) + c(t) +A(t− 1, Vt−1)⊤V (t− 1)−
)
.
Remark 3.7. Note that in the construction of V k in step (iie) of the fictitious default algorithm
we utilize the relative liabilities Π(t, Vt−1) in the matrix inverse rather than the relative exposures
7
A(t, (Vt−1, V
k)). This has the added benefit that this definition of V k is not a fixed point
problem, which it would be if the relative exposures matrix at time t were considered. This
change is possible since, as discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.3, any clearing solution must be
in the domain so that the relative liabilities and exposures coincide. This additionally provides
the invertibility of this matrix using standard input-output results as discussed in [14, 21].
We wish to finish up our discussion of the discrete-time Eisenberg-Noe framework by con-
sidering some extensions involving loans.
Remark 3.8. The theoretical framework presented in this paper can be easily extended to
incorporate the concepts of loans until some (deterministic) insolvency condition is hit. In
particular, we will consider loans made from a central bank or lender of last resort who we will
assume are part of the societal node 0. From this perspective we consider three cases that a
firm might be in:
• solvent and liquid in which case the firm has positive equity and pays off its obligations
in full;
• solvent and distressed in which case the firm has negative equity, but receives an
overnight loan (with interest rate set at the risk-free rate for simplicity) to cover all obli-
gations due on that date; and
• insolvent in which the firm will not receive any loans and is sent to a bankruptcy court.
The determination whether a firm is solvent can be done with an appropriate exogenous solvency
function. We will assume that once a firm is deemed insolvent it can never recover to solvency
again. Two possible systems for considering insolvent firms are:
(i) Receivership: In such a system, when a firm is deemed insolvent it is placed in receiver-
ship so that obligations are payed out on a first-come first-serve basis.
(ii) Auctions: In such a system, when a firm is deemed insolvent its future assets are auctioned
off in order to pay the future liabilities (in a proportional scheme) at the next time point.
This will then affect the cash flows c and nominal liabilities L, as such we would need to
consider c(t, Vt−1) and L(t, Vt−1) to truly consider this case. We refer to [7] for a detailed
discussion of the auction model for insolvency. The auction system can be interpreted
as an internal mechanism for determining bankruptcy costs in contrast to the exogenous
parameter in, e.g., [37].
The existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions in these scenarios require an additional
monotonicity property; we can use the notion a speculative system from [4] to get the desired
results. This condition encodes the notion that a firm does not benefit from any firm’s distress.
4 Continuous-time clearing systems
Consider now a continuous set of clearing times T, e.g., T = [0, T ] for some (finite) terminal
time T < ∞ or T = R+. As before, for processes we will use the notation from [13] such that
the process Z : T→ Rn has value of Z(t) at time t ∈ T and history Zt := (Z(s))s∈[0,t]. We will
now construct an extension of the continuous-time setting of [40] in that we allow for liabilities
to change over time and for firms to have stochastic cash flows.
In order to construct a continuous-time model we will begin by considering our network
parameters of cash flows and nominal liabilities. Instead of considering c(t) to be the net cash
flow at time t ∈ T, we will consider the term dc(t) of marginal change in cash flow at time
t. Similarly we will consider dL(t) to be the marginal change in nominal liabilities matrix at
time t; we note that by assumption dLij(t) ≥ 0 for all firms i, j ∈ N0 as, without any payments
made, total liabilities should accumulate over time. Our main result in this section (Theorem 4.5)
provides existence and uniqueness of the clearing wealths driven by (dc, dL) when c(t) =
∫ t
0 dc(s)
is an Itô process and L(t) =
∫ t
0 dL(s) is deterministic and continuous (e.g., dL does not include
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any Dirac delta functions). This setting, and the results on the continuous-time Eisenberg-
Noe model, can be extended to the case in which the cash flows and liabilities are additionally
functions of the wealths V . For simplicity, in this section we will restrict ourselves so that the
parameters are independent of the current wealths. In order to construct a continuous-time
differential system, we will consider again the discrete-time setting with explicit time steps ∆t.
Assumption 4.1. The cash flows c are defined by the Itô stochastic differential equation
dc(t) = µ(t, c(t))dt + σ(t, c(t))dW (t) for (n + 1)-vector of Brownian motions W over some
filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈T,P). Additionally, the drift and diffusion functions µ :
T × Rn+1 → Rn+1 and σ : T × Rn+1 → R(n+1)×(n+1) are jointly continuous and satisfy the
linear growth and Lipschitz continuous conditions, i.e., there exist constants C,D > 0 such that
for all times t ∈ T and cash flows c, d ∈ Rn+1
‖µ(t, c)‖1 + ‖σ(t, c)‖op1 ≤ C(1 + ‖c‖1)
‖µ(t, c)− µ(t, d)‖1 + ‖σ(t, c)− σ(t, d)‖op1 ≤ D‖c− d‖1
where ‖ ·‖1 is the 1-norm and ‖ ·‖op1 is the corresponding operator norm. The nominal liabilities
L : T → R(n+1)×(n+1)+ are deterministic and twice differentiable; for notation we will define
dL(t) = L˙(t)dt and d2L(t) = L¨(t)dt2. Further, the relative liabilities to society is bounded from
below by a level δ > 0, i.e., inft∈T
dLi0(t)∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
= δ > 0 for all banks i ∈ N .
We remark that the assumption on the cash flows can be relaxed so long as the stochastic
differential equation has a unique strong solution on T and µ, σ satisfy a local linear growth
condition and are locally Lipschitz. This relaxation will be applied in Examples 5.3 and 5.7.
In the prior section on a discrete-time model for clearing wealths, we implicitly assumed
a constant time-step between each clearing date of ∆t = 1 throughout. In order to con-
struct a continuous-time clearing model we will begin by making a discrete-time model with
an explicit ∆t > 0 term. In fact, this is immediate from the prior construction with a mi-
nor alteration to the cash flow term. Herein we construct the net cash flow at time t to be
given by ∆c(t,∆t) :=
∫ t
t−∆t dc(s) and the nominal liabilities at time t are similarly provided
by ∆L(t,∆t) :=
∫ t
t−∆t dL(s) where both dc and dL are discussed above (additionally, we set
dc(−t) = 0 and dL(−t) = 0 for any times t < 0). The choice of notation for ∆c and ∆L are to
make explicit the “change” inherent in the construction.
With these parameters we can construct the ∆t-discrete-time clearing process V (t,∆t) and
exposure matrix A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t)) by:
V (t,∆t) = V (t−∆t,∆t) + ∆c(t,∆t)−A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤V (t,∆t)−
+A(t−∆t,∆t, Vt−∆t(∆t))⊤V (t−∆t,∆t)−
(7)
aij(t,∆t, Vt(∆t)) =
∆Lij(t,∆t) + aij(t−∆t,∆t, Vt−∆t(∆t))Vi(t−∆t,∆t)−
max{∑k∈N0 ∆Lik(t,∆t) + Vi(t−∆t,∆t)−, Vi(t,∆t)−} 1{i6=0}
+
1
n
1{i=0, j 6=0} ∀i, j ∈ N0.
(8)
Here we assume that V (t) = V (−1) ≥ 0 for every time t < 0 as in Assumption 3.2. This
construction can be computed either in continuous time t ∈ T with sliding intervals of size ∆t
or at the discrete times t ∈ {0,∆t, ..., T }. The existence and uniqueness of this system follow
exactly as in Theorem 3.3 under Assumption 4.1.
Corollary 4.2. Let (dc, dL) : T → Rn+1 × R(n+1)×(n+1)+ define a dynamic financial network
satisfying Assumption 4.1 such that every bank has cash flow at least at the level dictated by
nominal interbank liabilities, i.e., ∆ci(t,∆t) ≥
∑
j∈N ∆Lji(t,∆t) −
∑
j∈N0
∆Lij(t,∆t) for all
banks i ∈ N0, times t ∈ T, and step-sizes ∆t > 0. Under Assumption 3.2, there exists a unique
solution of clearing wealths V : T×R++ → Rn+1 to (7). Further, the clearing wealths are jointly
continuous in time and step-size.
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Now we want to consider the limiting behavior of this discrete-time system as ∆t tends to
0. To do so, first, we will consider the formulation of the relative exposures aij from bank i to
j. From Corollary 4.2 and Assumption 4.1, we know that for any time t ∈ T and bank i ∈ N
it must follow that
∑
k∈N0
∆Lik(t,∆t) + Vi(t−∆t,∆t)− ≥ Vi(t,∆t)− for ∆t > 0 small enough
due to the joint continuity of the wealths in time and step-size. Thus in the limiting case, as
∆tց 0, we find that we can consider the relative liabilities rather than the relative exposures,
i.e., for ∆t small enough
aij(t,∆t, Vt(∆t)) =
∆Lij(t,∆t) + aij(t−∆t,∆t, Vt−∆t(∆t))Vi(t−∆t,∆t)−∑
k∈N0
∆Lik(t,∆t) + Vi(t−∆t,∆t)− 1{i6=0}
+
1
n
1{i=0, j 6=0} ∀i, j ∈ N0.
(9)
Rearranging these terms we are able to deduce that, for any firm i ∈ N ,
[aij(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))− aij(t−∆t,∆t, Vt−∆t(∆t))]Vi(t−∆t,∆t)−
= ∆Lij(t,∆t)− aij(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))
∑
k∈N0
∆Lik(t,∆t).
(10)
Coupled with the assumption that the societal node always has positive wealth, we are thus
able to consider the limiting behavior of (7) as the step-size ∆t tends to 0. To do so, consider
V (t,∆t) = V (t−∆t,∆t) + ∆c(t,∆t)−A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤V (t,∆t)−
+A(t−∆t,∆t, Vt−∆t)⊤V (t−∆t,∆t)−
= V (t−∆t,∆t) + ∆c(t,∆t)
−A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤V (t,∆t)− +A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤V (t−∆t,∆t)−
−A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤V (t−∆t,∆t)− +A(t−∆t,∆t, Vt−∆t)⊤V (t−∆t,∆t)−
= V (t−∆t,∆t) + ∆c(t,∆t)−A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤[V (t,∆t)− − V (t−∆t,∆t)−]
−∆L(t,∆t)⊤~1 +A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤∆L(t,∆t)~1.
Consider the notation for the matrix of distressed firms from the fictitious default algorithm
(Algorithm 3.6), i.e., Λ(V ) ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) is the diagonal matrix of banks in distress
Λij(V ) =
{
1 if i = j 6= 0 and Vi < 0
0 else
∀i, j ∈ N0.
We are able to set Λ00(V ) = 0 without loss of generality since, by assumption, the outside node
0 has no obligations into the system. Thus, as with (9), by continuity of the clearing wealths
and ∆t small enough, we can conclude that except at specific event times (to be considered
later, see Algorithm 4.7) it follows that Λ(V (t,∆t)) = Λ(V (t−∆t,∆t)). Thus, with this added
notation we can reformulate the clearing wealths equation (7) as
V (t,∆t) = V (t−∆t,∆t) +A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤Λ(V (t,∆t))[V (t,∆t)− V (t−∆t,∆t)] + ∆c(t,∆t)
−∆L(t,∆t)⊤~1 +A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤∆L(t,∆t)~1.
For the construction of a differential form we can consider the equivalent formulation
V (t,∆t)− V (t−∆t,∆t) =
[I −A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤Λ(V (t,∆t))]−1
(
∆c(t,∆t)−∆L(t,∆t)⊤~1
+A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))
⊤∆L(t,∆t)~1
)
.
(11)
Note that I − A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤Λ(V (t,∆t)) is invertible by standard input-output results and
as proven in Proposition B.1.
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Utilizing (11) and (9) and taking the limit as ∆tց 0, we are thus able to construct the joint
differential system:
dV (t) = [I −A(t)⊤Λ(V (t))]−1
(
dc(t)− dL(t)⊤~1 +A(t)⊤dL(t)~1
)
(12)
daij(t) =


d2Lij(t)−aij(t)
∑
k∈N0
d2Lik(t)
∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
if i ∈ N , Vi(t) ≥ 0
dLij(t)−aij(t)
∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
Vi(t)−
if i ∈ N , Vi(t) < 0
0 if i = 0
∀i, j ∈ N0 (13)
with initial conditions V (0) ≥ 0 given and aij(0) = dLij(0)∑
k∈N0
dLik(0)
1{i6=0} +
1
n1{i=0, j 6=0} for all
firms i, j ∈ N0. As in (11), I − A(t)⊤Λ(V (t)) is invertible by standard input-output results
and as proven in Proposition B.1. The first case in (13) is constructed by noting that aij(t) =
dLij(t)∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
if Vi(t) ≥ 0 and i ∈ N and da0j(t) = 0 for any firm j ∈ N0 for all times t; the
second case in (13) follows from (10) and taking the limit as ∆tց 0. Note that this differential
system is discontinuous, with events at times when firms cross the 0 wealth boundary, i.e.,
when Λ(V (t)) 6= Λ(V (t−)). As such, we will consider the differential system on the inter-event
intervals, then update the differential system between these intervals. This is made more explicit
in the proof of Theorem 4.5 and in Algorithm 4.7. As with the discrete-time system (8), the
relative exposures follow the incoming proportional obligations if a firm has a surplus wealth.
When a firm is in distress, the relative exposures follow a path that provides the average relative
obligations between new liabilities and the prior unpaid liabilities.
Remark 4.3. As in the discrete-time section we consider the debt to roll forward in this case.
In this way we encode the notion of either intra-day dynamics in this model or when bankruptcy
court would not settle debts before the terminal time T for the system. To allow for insolvencies,
we can consider some (deterministic) mechanism to determine when a bank becomes insolvent
and restart the differential system with updated parameters from that time point, e.g., using an
instantaneous auction as in [7]; see also Remarks 3.7 and 4.8.
We will complete our discussion of the construction of this differential system by providing
some properties on the relative liabilities and exposures matrix A. Notably, these properties are
those that would be expected from the discrete-time setting for the relative exposures. Namely,
as a firm recovers from a distressed state its relative liabilities return to be only the fraction of
incoming liabilities, that the relative exposures are bounded from below by 0 (and to society
by δ as provided in Assumption 4.1), and the relative exposure matrix is row stochastic at all
times.
Proposition 4.4. Let (dc, dL) : T→ Rn+1 × R(n+1)×(n+1)+ define a dynamic financial network
satisfying Assumption 4.1. Let (V,A) : T → Rn+1 × R(n+1)×(n+1) be any solution of the dif-
ferential system (12) and (13) satisfying Assumption 3.2. The relative exposure matrix A(t)
satisfies the following properties:
(i) For any bank i ∈ N , if Vi(t)ր 0 as tր τ then limtրτ aij(t) = dLij(τ)∑
k∈N0
dLik(τ)
.
(ii) For all times t ∈ T and for any bank i ∈ N , the elements aij(t) ≥ 0 for all banks j ∈ N
and ai0(t) ≥ δ;
(iii) For all times t ∈ T and for any bank i ∈ N0, the row sums
∑
k∈N0
aik(t) = 1;
With this differential construction (12) and (13), we seek to prove existence and uniqueness
of the clearing solutions. For notational simplicity, define the space of relative exposure matrices
A :=
{
A ∈ [0, 1](n+1)×(n+1) | A~1 = ~1, aii = 0, ai0 ≥ δ ∀i ∈ N , a0j = 1
n
∀j ∈ N
}
.
From Proposition 4.4, we have already proven that if (V,A) : T → Rn+1 × R(n+1)×(n+1) is a
solution to the continuous-time Eisenberg-Noe system then A(t) ∈ A for all times t ∈ T.
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Theorem 4.5. Let T = [0, T ] be a finite time period and let (dc, dL) : T→ Rn+1×R(n+1)×(n+1)+
define a dynamic financial network satisfying Assumption 4.1. There exists a unique strong
solution to the clearing wealths and relative exposures (V,A) satisfying (12) and (13) if V (0) ∈
R
n+1
++ .
Remark 4.6. The restrictions on the cash flows dc made in Assumption 4.1 can be relaxed to
depend explicitly on the wealths and relative exposures, i.e.,
dc(t) = µ(t, c(t), V (t), A(t))dt + σ(t, c(t), V (t), A(t))dW (t).
This would still guarantee a unique strong solution of the clearing wealths and relative exposures
as in Theorem 4.5 so long as µ, σ satisfy a local linear growth condition, local Lipschitz condition,
and c(t) can be bounded above and below by elements of L2t (Rn+1) for all time t.
We now present an algorithm for numerically computing an approximation of a single sample
path for the continuous-time Eisenberg-Noe clearing system. To do so we consider Euler’s
method for differential equations with an event finding algorithm.
Algorithm 4.7. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.5 for a fixed event ω ∈ Ω the clear-
ing wealths process V : T → Rn+1 and relative exposures A : T → A can be found by the
following algorithm. Fix a step-size ∆t0 > 0. Initialize t = 0, V (0) ≥ 0 given, aij(0) =
dLij(0)∑
k∈N0
dLik(0)
1{i6=0} +
1
n1{i=0, j 6=0}, and Λ = {0}(n+1)×(n+1). Repeat until t ≥ T :
(i) Initialize Λ0 6= Λ and ∆t = ∆t0.
(ii) Sample Z ∼ N(0, I).
(iii) Repeat until Λ0 = Λ:
(a) Set Λ0 = Λ.
(b) Compute
µ¯(t) = (I −A(t)⊤Λ)−1
(
µ(t, c(t))− L˙(t)⊤~1 +A(t)⊤L˙(t)~1
)
σ¯(t) = (I −A(t)⊤Λ)−1σ(t, c(t))Z.
(c) Loop through each bank i ∈ N :
i. If Vi(t) > 0, µ¯i(t) < 0, and σ¯i(t)
2 − 4µ¯i(t)Vi(t) ≥ 0 then
∆t = min

∆t ,
(
−σ¯i(t)−
√
σ¯i(t)2 − 4µ¯i(t)Vi(t)
2µ¯i(t)
)2
 .
ii. If Vi(t) < 0, µ¯i(t) 6= 0, and σ¯i(t)2 − 4µ¯i(t)Vi(t) ≥ 0 then
∆t = min

∆t ,
(
−σ¯i(t) +
√
σ¯i(t)2 − 4µ¯i(t)Vi(t)
2µ¯i(t)
)2
 .
iii. If µ¯i(t) = 0 and Vi(t)σ¯i(t) < 0 then ∆t = min
{
∆t , Vi(t)
2/σ¯i(t)
2
}
.
iv. If µ¯i(t)σ¯i(t) < 0 then ∆t = min
{
∆t , σ¯i(t)
2/µ¯i(t)
2
}
.
(d) Compute ∆V (t) = µ¯(t)∆t+ σ¯(t)
√
∆t.
(e) Define the matrix Λ ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) such that
Λij =


0 if i = j 6= 0, Vi(t) > 0 or [Vi(t) = 0, ∆Vi(t) ≥ 0]
1 if i = j 6= 0, Vi(t) < 0 or [Vi(t) = 0, ∆Vi(t) < 0]
0 else
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(iv) Define the matrix Λ¯ ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) so that Λ¯ =
{
1 if i = j 6= 0, Vi(t) < 0
0 else
.
(v) Set
c(t+∆t) = c(t) + µ(t, c(t))∆t+ σ(t, c(t))
√
∆tZ
V (t+∆t) = V (t) + ∆V (t)
A(t+∆t) = Λ¯
[
A(t) + diag(V (t)−)−1[L˙(t)−A(t) ∗ (L˙(t)1)]∆t
]
+ (I − Λ¯) diag(L˙(t)~1)−1L˙(t).
where 1 = {1}(n+1)×(n+1) and ∗ denotes the element-wise multiplication operator.
(vi) Increment t = t+∆t.
If t > T then set
c(T ) = c(t−∆t) + c(t)− c(t−∆t)
∆t
(T − [t−∆t])
V (T ) = V (t−∆t) + V (t)− V (t−∆t)
∆t
(T − [t−∆t])
A(T ) = A(t−∆t) + A(t)−A(t−∆t)
∆t
(T − [t−∆t]).
In the above event-finding algorithm for the continuous-time Eisenberg-Noe system, the
main concern is that we do not increment time too far in any step so as to pass over an event
(e.g., a solvent bank becoming a distressed bank). This is accomplished in the loop described
in step (iiic). In particular, (iii(c)i)-(iii(c)iii) guarantee that Vi(t) + µ¯i(t)∆t + σ¯i(t)
√
∆t is
nonnegative if Vi(t) > 0 and nonpositive if Vi(t) < 0. The additional condition in (iii(c)iv)
guarantees that the direction of µ¯i(t)∆t + σ¯i(t)
√
∆t is maintained as ∆t shrinks, i.e., if ∆t is
too large then the direction of the change in wealth could be impacted by choosing a smaller
(and thus more accurate) step-size. While not strictly necessary, we include step (iii(c)iv) as it
improves the accuracy of the algorithm.
Remark 4.8. As with the discrete-time setting discussed in Remark 3.7, we can introduce
the concept of loans from a central bank to the continuous-time Eisenberg-Noe system. To do
so we would need to introduce stopping times associated with each bank becoming insolvent.
Notably, the receivership setting would act the same as our described continuous-time Eisenberg-
Noe system after insolvencies occur. In contrast, a pure auction model would eliminate all need
for continuous-time contagion. At the time of the auction a static system would be considered,
e.g., the static Eisenberg-Noe clearing, based on the results of the auction; this would update
the cash flow parameters for each firm going forward, but no dynamic contagion would need to
be modeled.
We wish to conclude our discussion of the continuous-time Eisenberg-Noe system by provid-
ing a result on how the unique solution to the discrete-time solution converges to the continuous-
time solution as ∆t ց 0. That is, we wish to consider how the unique clearing wealths and
relative exposures solving the discrete-time systems (7) and (8) converge to those in continuous-
time Eisenberg-Noe system (12) and (13) as the step-size decreases to 0.
Lemma 4.9. Consider the setting of Corollary 4.2 and Theorem 4.5. Then the continuous-time
clearing solutions at any time t ∈ T is the limit of the discrete-time solution as the step-size
tends to 0, i.e., (V (t), A(t)) = lim∆tց0(V (t,∆t), A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))) where (V (·,∆t), A(·,∆t))
satisfy (7) and (8) and (V,A) satisfy (12) and (13).
5 Discussion
In this section we will consider the implications of time on the clearing solutions in the Eisenberg-
Noe setting. Specifically, we will focus on the continuous-time formulation, though all conclu-
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sions hold in the discrete-time setting as well. Notably, we deduce rules so as to recreate the
static Eisenberg-Noe clearing solution via our continuous-time differential system, which (in-
dependently) replicates the results from [40]. Further, we consider the implications of time
dynamics on the health of the financial system by determining bounds on how different the
static clearing solution and a dynamic solution might be. This demonstrates the importance of
time dynamics on accurately assessing the health and wealth of the financial system.
5.1 The static model as a differential system
Herein we will consider the case in which the relative liabilities are constant through time.
That is, we consider the setting in which dLij(s)/
∑
k∈N0
dLik(s) = dLij(t)/
∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
for all times s, t ∈ T and firms i, j ∈ N0 so long as
∑
k∈N0
dLik(s),
∑
k∈N0
dLik(t) > 0. The
key implication of this assumption is that the relative exposures matrix in (13) can be found
explicitly to equal the relative liabilities
aij(t) = πij :=


dLij(si)∑
k∈N0
dLik(si)
if si < supT
1
n if si = supT, j 6= i
0 if si = supT, j = i
for all times t and banks i, j ∈ N0 where si ∈ {t ∈ T |
∑
k∈N0
dLik(t) > 0} chosen arbitrarily
strictly less than supT (and si = supT if the supremum is taken over the empty set).
Further, expanding and solving the differential system (12), we deduce that the continuous-
time clearing wealths must satisfy the fixed point problem
V (t) = V (0) +
∫ t
0
dc(s)−Π⊤V (t)− (14)
at all time t ∈ T. Therefore, if ∫ t0 dc(s) ≥ ∫ t0 dL(s)⊤~1 − ∫ t0 dL(s)~1 at some time t, it follows
that V (t) are the static clearing wealths to the Eisenberg-Noe system with aggregated data
with nominal liabilities matrix defined by
∫ t
0 dL(s) and (incoming) external cash flow given by∫ t
0 dc(s) −
(∫ t
0 dL(s)
⊤~1− ∫ t0 dL(s)~1). Importantly, this means that, if the relative liabilities
are kept constant over time, taking aggregated data and considering the static Eisenberg-Noe
framework will produce the same final clearing wealths as the dynamic Eisenberg-Noe setting
presented in this paper. However, though the set of defaulting banks is the same as in the static
setting, the order of defaults need not strictly follow the order given in the fictitious default
algorithm of [14].
Definition 5.1. A bank is called a kth-order default in the static Eisenberg-Noe setting if it
is determined to be in default in the kth iteration of the fictitious default algorithm (see, e.g.,
[14, Section 3.1] or the inner loop of Algorithm 3.6).
We note that the first-order defaults are exactly those firms that have negative wealth even
if it has no negative exposure to other firms (i.e., all other firms satisfy their obligations in full).
Proposition 5.2. Let (x, L¯) ∈ Rn+1+ × R(n+1)×(n+1)+ denote the static incoming external cash
flow and nominal liabilities. Define a dynamic system over the time period T = [0, T ] such that
V (0) ∈ [0, x], dL(t) = 1T L¯dt, and dc(t) = 1T
(
x− V (0) + L¯⊤~1− L¯~1
)
dt. The clearing wealths
at the terminal time V (T ) are equal to those given in the static setting. Additionally, no firm
will ever recover from distress in the dynamic setting. Finally, the first kth-order default will
occur only after the first (k − 1)th-order default in the static fictitious default algorithm; in
particular, the first firm to become distressed will be a first-order default in the static fictitious
default algorithm.
Proof. The fact that the clearing wealths V (T ) are equal to the static Eisenberg-Noe clearing
wealths (as defined in Proposition 2.1) follows from (14) and the logic given in the proof of
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Lemma 4.9. Additionally, since dc(t) is constant in time and firms are beginning in a solvent
state, over time the unpaid liabilities may accumulate as a negative factor on bank balance
sheets, but there is no outlet to allow for a firm to recover from distress. Finally, by definition,
a kth-order default is only driven into distress through the failure of the (k−1)th-order defaults
(and not solely by the (k−2)th-order defaults). Therefore, by way of contradiction, if a kth-order
default were to occur before any (k − 1)th-order default then such a firm must default without
regard to what happens to the (k− 1)th-order defaults, i.e., this firm must be a (k− 1)th-order
default. By this same logic, the first firm to become distressed must be a first-order default.
The notion of real defaulting times differing from the order introduced by the fictitious
default algorithm of [14] is unsurprising. Consider a financial system with two subgraphs that
are only connected through their obligations to the societal node. By construction, the default
of a firm in one subgraph will have no impact on the firms in the other subgraph. Thus we
can construct a network so that all defaults in one subgraph (including higher order defaults as
defined in Definition 5.1) occur before any first-order defaults in the other subgraph.
Notably, Proposition 5.2 states that, provided the aggregate data (until the terminal time) is
kept constant, the clearing wealths at the terminal time will be path-independent in this setting.
We will demonstrate this with an illustrative example demonstrating this setting in a small 4
bank (plus societal node) system. In particular, we will consider the cash flows c to be defined
as a Brownian bridge so as to provide the appropriate aggregate data at the terminal time.
Example 5.3. Consider a financial system with four banks, each with an additional obligation
to an external societal node. Consider the time interval T = [0, 1] with aggregated data such that
the initial wealths are given by V (0) = (100, 1, 3, 2, 5)⊤, cash flows dc are such that
∫ 1
0
dc(s) =
L¯⊤~1− L¯~1, and where the nominal liabilities matrix dL = L¯dt is defined by
L¯ =


0 0 0 0 0
3 0 7 1 1
3 3 0 3 3
3 1 1 0 1
3 1 2 1 0

 .
The static Eisenberg-Noe clearing wealths, with nominal liabilities L¯ and external assets V (0),
are found to be V (1) ≈ (109.38,−6.81,−3.03,−0.32, 1.62)⊤. Further, from the static fictitious
default algorithm, we can determine that bank 1 is a first-order default, bank 2 is a second-order
default, and bank 3 is a third-order default. Consider now three dynamic settings which are
differentiated only by the choice of the cash flows dc:
(i) Consider the deterministic setting introduced in Proposition 5.2, i.e., dc(t) = [L¯⊤~1− L¯~1]dt
for all times t ∈ T.
(ii) Consider a Brownian bridge with low volatility, i.e., dc(t) = L¯
⊤~1−L¯~1−c(t)
1−t dt + dW (t) for
vector of independent Brownian motions W and with c(0) = 0.
(iii) Consider a Brownian bridge with high volatility, i.e., dc(t) = L¯
⊤~1−L¯~1−c(t)
1−t dt+ 5dW (t) for
vector of independent Brownian motions W and with c(0) = 0.
A single sample path for each dynamic setting is provided. In each plot we reduce the equity
of the societal node by 100 so that it begins with an initial wealth of 0, but more importantly
so that it can easily be displayed on the same plot as the other 4 institutions. First, we point
out that, as indicated by the circles at the terminal time in each plot, the terminal wealths of
the continuous-time setting match up with the clearing wealths in the static model. We further
note that in the deterministic setting (Figure 2a) and the low volatility setting (Figure 2b) the
order of defaults is maintained. However, in the high volatility setting (Figure 2c) the order of
defaults given by the fictitious default algorithm no longer holds.
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(a) Example 5.3: Clearing wealths over time un-
der deterministic and constant cash flows.
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(b) Example 5.3: Clearing wealths over time un-
der low volatility Brownian bridge cash flows.
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(c) Example 5.3: Clearing wealths over time un-
der high volatility Brownian bridge cash flows.
Figure 2: Example 5.3: Comparison of clearing wealths under deterministic and random cash flows
that aggregate to the same terminal values.
5.2 The implications of time dynamics
Now we will consider the case in which the relative liabilities change over time. As in the prior
discussion, we will focus on the setting in which the aggregate cash flows and interbank liabilities
correspond to a static Eisenberg-Noe model. As the liabilities are now changing over time there
is an inherent prioritization in the obligations due to the rolling forward of unpaid debts. Any
earlier obligations are more likely to be paid, and accumulate to be paid proportionally with any
new obligations. As such, by altering only the rate at which the liabilities are due, the terminal
wealths and also the set of defaulting firms can be modified. Proposition 5.5 provides analysis
on which banks will always be solvent and which will always be in default at the terminal time.
In particular, the results of Proposition 5.5 show that the static Eisenberg-Noe model applied
to aggregate data can produce a viewpoint on the health of the financial system that is either
incorrectly optimistic or pessimistic; without explicitly knowing the dynamics of the cash flows
and liabilities, only rough estimates can be considered. This is in contrast to, e.g., [30] in which
data from the European Banking Authority’s 2011 stress test was utilized to assess the health
of the European financial system without time dynamics.
Definition 5.4. In the static Eisenberg-Noe setting a bank is called a first-order solvency
if it has positive wealth even under the maximum negative exposure (i.e., no other firms pay at
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Time
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
W
ea
lth
Society: V0(t)-100
Bank 1: V1(t)
Bank 2: V2(t)
Bank 3: V3(t)
Bank 4: V4(t)
(b) Example 5.6: Clearing wealths over time un-
der setting to have all but the first order-solvency
defaulting at the terminal time.
Figure 3: Example 5.6: Comparison of clearing wealths under different ordering of the nominal
liabilities in time that aggregate to the same terminal values.
all).
Note that, by assumption, the societal node 0 will always be a first-order solvent institution.
Proposition 5.5. Let (x, L¯) ∈ Rn+1+ × R(n+1)×(n+1)+ denote the static incoming external cash
flow and nominal liabilities. Define a dynamic system over the time period T = [0, T ] such that
V (0) ∈ [0, x], ∫ T
0
dL(t) = L¯, and
∫ T
0
dc(t) = x− V (0) + L¯⊤~1− L¯~1. At time T , those banks that
are first-order defaults in the static setting will be in default in the dynamic setting. Similarly,
those banks that are first-order solvencies in the static setting will be solvent in the dynamic
setting at the terminal time.
Proof. This result follows from the definition of a first-order default or solvency as such firms
allow us to disregard all interbank dynamics.
To conclude this discussion, we will consider two examples with the same aggregate values as
given in Example 5.3. The first example considers the case in which the nominal liabilities are
shifted in time so as to have the maximum possible number of banks be solvent or, vice versa,
the maximum number of banks be in default at the terminal time. The second example considers
a fixed structure for the nominal liabilities in time (but non-constant relative liabilities), thus
demonstrating the path-dependence of the clearing wealths on the cash flows.
Example 5.6. Consider the financial system described in Example 5.3 over the time interval
T = [0, 1] with aggregated data such that the initial wealths V (0) = (100, 1, 3, 2, 5)⊤ and where
the aggregate nominal liabilities matrix is defined by L¯. Further, consider the cash flows dc(t) =
dL(t)⊤~1− dL(t)~1 for all times t ∈ T where dL is either:
(i) prioritizing the defaulting firms: dL(t) = 5L¯
(
E01{t∈(0.8,1]} +
∑
i∈N Ei1{t∈(0.2(i−1),0.2i]}
)
,
or
(ii) prioritizing society: dL(t) = 5L¯
(
E01{t∈[0,0.2)} +
∑
i∈N Ei1{t∈(0.2i,0.2(i+1)]}
)
where the collection of matrices Ei ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) are such that (Ei)ii = 1 and all other
elements are set to 0. As in Figure 2, the circles at the terminal time in both plots denote the
clearing wealths under the static Eisenberg-Noe setting. It is clear in both examples that the
terminal dynamic clearing wealths now are not equal to the static wealths. Further, by choosing
the liabilities to be introduced in the order provided we provide the settings so that only the
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Figure 4: Example 5.7: Empirical distribution of the terminal societal wealths under random cash
flows. The × marks the societal wealth under the static Eisenberg-Noe framework with aggregated
data.
first-order defaults, Bank 1, have negative terminal wealth (Figure 3a) or so that only the first-
order solvencies, the societal firm, have positive terminal wealth (Figure 3b). In Figure 3a,
we notice that firms 2 and 3 have a terminal wealth of 0, so although they are not defaulting,
they do not have any positive equity either. Further, it is clear that though all financial firms
have improved their wealth given this ordering of the nominal liabilities, the societal wealth
is decreased (though to a lesser amount than the aggregate improvement for the banks) in
comparison to the static results. In contrast, in the second scenario in which obligations to
society are first (Figure 3b), the societal wealths are greater than those provided in the static
setting but all banks have less wealth. Notice further that, even after the obligations to society
have “ended” at time 0.2 the societal wealth still increases. This occurs as the banks in distress
receive money as their incoming liabilities come due and thus they have cash to immediately
transfer to cover the prior unpaid obligations to, e.g., society. Finally, this numerically verifies
the results of Proposition 5.5 and demonstrates the importance of understanding the order of
obligations for an accurate measure of the health of the financial system.
Example 5.7. Consider the financial system described in Example 5.3 over the time interval
T = [0, 1] with aggregated data such that the initial wealths V (0) = (100, 1, 3, 2, 5)⊤ and where
the aggregate nominal liabilities matrix is defined by L¯. Further, consider the nominal liabilities
determined by
dL(t) = L¯
(
E0 +
1
0.237E11{t∈[0.145,0.382]} +
1
0.178E21{t∈[0.331,0.509]}
+ 10.439E31{t∈[0.301,0.740]} +
1
0.105E41{t∈[0.673,0.778]}
)
where the collection of matrices Ei ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) are such that (Ei)ii = 1 and all other
elements are set to 0. Finally, consider the cash flows determined by a Brownian bridge with
volatility of 2, i.e., dc(t) = L¯
⊤~1−L¯~1−c(t)
1−t dt+2dW (t) for vector of independent Brownian motions
W and with c(0) = 0. Figure 4 depicts the empirical distribution of the terminal societal
wealths under 10,000 samples of the Brownian bridge cash flows. The black curve depicts the
kernel density for this empirical distribution. The × illustrates the societal wealth under the
static Eisenberg-Noe framework considering the aggregated data (as provided in Example 5.3).
The key takeaway of this figure is the payments to society range from 8.12 to 10.20 out of
an obligated 12, i.e., society can experience anywhere from 16% to 32% shortfall in payments
depending on the sample path. This also implies that society can experience anywhere from
a 13.4% decrease to an 8.8% increase over the payments found under the static Eisenberg-Noe
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model. Similar results can be shown for the other firms in the system as well. Notably, firms 2,
3, and 4 all have simulations in which they are solvent at the terminal time and simulations in
which they are defaulting on their obligations. Recall none of these three firms are first-order
defaults or first-order solvencies. Empirically, firm 2 (a second-order default) is found to default
in approximately 98% of the simulations; firm 3 (a third-order default) is found to default in
approximately 3.6% of simulations; firm 4 (which does not default in the static setting) is found
to default in just 0.03% of the provided simulations (i.e., 3 out of the 10,000 simulations).
Therefore, if relative liabilities are not constant over time, the order of the cash flows can have
a significant impact on the health of the system.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we considered an extension of the financial contagion model of [14] to allow for
cash flows and obligations to be dynamic in time. We presented this model in both discrete
and continuous time, thus extending the frameworks of [7, 23, 33] which consider only discrete-
time clearing. Notably, we determine conditions for existence and uniqueness of the clearing
solutions under deterministic and Itô settings. In this way, we have written a dynamical system
for the Eisenberg-Noe contagion model that may include an inherent prioritization scheme.
Specifically, we determine that if the relative liabilities are constant over time then the dynamic
Eisenberg-Noe model presented herein will reproduce the static system at the terminal time
in a path-independent manner. Notably, in such a setting, we are able to determine the true
defaulting order rather than the fictitious order found in the fictitious default algorithm that
is widely used in computing static clearing models. If, however, the relative liabilities are not
constant over time, then we determine that the static Eisenberg-Noe model may report an
incorrectly optimistic or pessimistic picture of the financial system.
Three clear extensions of this model are apparent to us, and which we foresee creating further
divergence between static and dynamic models. The first extension is the inclusion of illiquid
assets and fire sales. In the static models, e.g., [12, 1, 18], there is no first mover advantage to
liquidating assets as all firms receive the same price. However, in a dynamic model there may
be advantage to liquidating early in order to receive a higher price, but which may precipitate
a larger fire sale amongst the other firms. The second extension is the inclusion of contingent
payments and credit default swaps. In the static setting this has recently been considered by
[4, 38, 39]. By considering the network dynamics to be dependent on the history of clearing
wealths, many of the difficulties reported in the static works are likely to be resolved naturally;
we refer to [4] which provides an initial discussion of this extension. The final extension, for
which we believe the proposed dynamic model will be especially useful, is in considering strate-
gic or dynamic actions by the market participants, e.g., incorporating bankruptcy costs and
strategic decisions on rolling forward of debt. We feel that the continuous-time framework will
be particularly suitable for these extensions as it allows us to construct unique clearing solutions
without requiring strong monotonicity assumption.
A Proof of results in Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We will prove this result inductively. First consider time t = 0. Recall
from Assumption 3.2 that V (−1) ≥ 0. The clearing wealths at time 0 follow the fixed point
equation
V (0) = Φ(0, V (0)) := V (−1) + c(0)−A(0, V0)⊤V (0)−.
Note that, by construction, A(0, V0)
⊤V (0)− ≤ L(0)⊤~1. Therefore any clearing solution must
fall within the compact range [V (−1)+c(0)−L(0)⊤~1, V (−1)+c(0)] ⊆ Rn+1. It is clear from the
definition that Φ(0, ·) is a monotonic operator, and thus there exists a greatest and least clearing
solution V ↑(0) ≥ V ↓(0) by Tarski’s fixed point theorem [45, Theorem 11.E], both of which must
fall within this domain. Further, aij(0, V0) =
Lij∑
k∈N0
Lik
(for i ∈ N and j ∈ N0) for any wealth
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V (0) in this domain since V (−1) + c(0) − L(0)⊤~1 ≥ −L(0)~1 = −p¯(0, V−1). We will prove
uniqueness as it is done in [14] by noting additionally that we can assume that the societal node
will always have positive equity (i.e., V ↓(0) ≥ 0). First, we will show that the positive equities
are the same for every firm no matter which clearing solution is chosen, i.e., V ↑i (0)
+ = V ↓i (0)
+
for every firm i ∈ N0. By definition V ↑(0) ≥ V ↓(0) and using
∑
j∈N0
aij(0) = 1 for every firm
i ∈ N0 we recover∑
i∈N0
V ↑i (0)
+ =
∑
i∈N0
[
V ↑i (0) + V
↑
i (0)
−
]
=
∑
i∈N0

Vi(−1) + ci(0)−∑
j∈N
aji(0, V
↑
0 )V
↑
j (0)
− + V ↑i (0)
−


=
∑
i∈N0
[Vi(−1) + ci(0)]−
∑
j∈N
V ↑j (0)
−
∑
i∈N0
aji(0, V
↑
0 ) +
∑
i∈N0
V ↑i (0)
−
=
∑
i∈N0
[Vi(−1) + ci(0)] =
∑
i∈N0
V ↓i (0)
+.
Therefore it must be the case that V ↑i (0)
+ = V ↓i (0)
+ for all firms i ∈ N0. Since we assume that
the societal node will always have positive equity, it must be the case that V ↑0 (0) = V
↓
0 (0). Now
since we assume that each node i ∈ N owes to the societal node, if any firm i ∈ N is such that
0 ≥ V ↑i (0) > V ↓i (0) then it must be that V ↑0 (0) > V ↓0 (0), which is a contraction.
Continuing with the inductive argument, assume that the history of clearing wealths Vt−1 up
to time t− 1 is fixed and known. The clearing wealths at time t follow the fixed point equation
V (t) = Φ(t, V (t)) := V (t− 1) + c(t)−A(t, Vt)⊤V (t)− +A(t− 1, Vt−1)⊤V (t− 1)−.
Note that, by construction, A(t, Vt)
⊤V (t)− ≤ L(t)⊤~1+A(t−1, Vt−1)⊤V (t−1)−. Therefore any
clearing solution must fall within the compact range [V (t− 1)+ c(t)−L(t)⊤~1, V (t− 1)+ c(t) +
A(t− 1, Vt−1)⊤V (t− 1)−] ⊆ Rn+1. Further, aij(t, Vt) = Lij+aij(t−1,Vt−1)Vi(t−1)
−
∑
k∈N0
Lik+Vi(t−1)−
(for i ∈ N and
j ∈ N0) for any wealth V (t) in this domain since V (t−1)+c(t)−L(t)⊤~1 ≥ −V (t−1)−−L(t)~1 =
−p¯(t, Vt−1). Thus we can apply the same logic as in the time 0 case to recover existence and
uniqueness of the clearing wealths V (t) at time t.
Proof of Corollary 3.5. This follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 3.3 using induction
and noting that the lattice upper and lower bounds for the domain and range spaces of Φ(s, ·)
are subsets of Lps(Rn+1). Therefore any clearing solution V (t) is bounded above and below by
an element of Lpt (Rn+1) and the result is proven.
B Proof of results in Section 4
Proof of Corollary 4.2. Existence and uniqueness of the clearing solutions follows from Theo-
rem 3.3. To prove continuity we will employ an induction argument. To do so, we will consider
the reduced domain V : T × [ǫ,∞) → Rn+1 for some ǫ > 0. That is, we restrict the step-size
∆t ≥ ǫ. As we will demonstrate that the continuity argument holds for any ǫ > 0 then the de-
sired result must hold as well. Before continuing, consider an expanded version of the recursive
formulation of (7), i.e.,
V (t,∆t) = V (−1) +
∫ t
0
dc(s)−A(t,∆t, Vt(∆t))⊤V (t,∆t)− (15)
for all times t ∈ T. Fix the minimal step-size ǫ > 0. Note that the relative exposures satisfy
aij(t,∆t, Vt(∆t)) :=
∫
t
0
dLij(s)∑
k∈N0
∫
t
0
dLik(s)
for any time t ∈ [0, ǫ) by the assumption that V (−1) ≥
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0. Thus we can conclude V : [0, ǫ) × [ǫ,∞) → Rn+1 is continuous by an application of [22,
Proposition A.2]. Now, by way of induction, assume that V : [0, s)×[ǫ,∞)→ Rn+1 is continuous
for some s > 0. Again, by [22, Proposition A.2], we are able to immediately conclude that
V : [0, s+ ǫ)∩T× [ǫ,∞)→ Rn+1 is continuous. As we are able to always extend the continuity
result by ǫ > 0 in time, the result is proven.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. (i) Consider firm i ∈ N . By assumption we have that aij(t) for
tր τ solves the first order differential equation:
daij(t)
dt
+
∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)/dt
Vi(t)−
aij(t) =
dLij(t)/dt
Vi(t)−
.
For sake of simplicity, let this differential equation start at time 0 with Vi(0) < 0 and some
initial value aij(0). Then this differential equation can be solved via the integrating factor
ν(t) :=
∫ t
0
∑
k∈N0
dLik(s)
Vi(s)−
ds. Thus for tր τ it follow that
aij(t) = e
−ν(t)
[∫ t
0
eν(s)
dLij(s)
Vi(s)−
+ aij(0)
]
.
Therefore, utilizing L’Hôspital’s rule,
lim
tրτ
aij(t) = lim
tրτ
e−ν(t)
[∫ t
0
eν(s)
dLij(s)
Vi(s)−
+ aij(0)
]
= lim
tրτ
eν(t)
dLij(t)
Vi(t)−
eν(t) ddtν(t)
= lim
tրτ
dLij(t)/Vi(t)
−∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)/Vi(t)−
=
dLij(τ)∑
k∈N0
dLik(τ)
.
(ii) First, if Vi(t) ≥ 0 then by construction (and the above result) it follows that aij(t) =
dLij(t)∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
≥ 0 for any i, j ∈ N0 and ai0(t) ≥ δ by this construction. Consider now
the case for Vi(t) < 0 and assume aij(t) < 0. Let τ = sup{s ≤ t | Vi(s) = 0}. Since
aij(τ) ∈ [0, 1] by construction and the relative exposures are continuous, this implies there
exists some time s ∈ [τ, t) such that aij(s) = 0. By the definition of the relative exposures,
this must follow that daij(s) ≥ 0 for any time aij(s) ≤ 0 (with daij(s) > 0 if aij(s) < 0),
thus aij(t) < 0 can never be reached. Further, assume ai0(t) < δ. By Assumption 4.1, if
ai0(s) ≤ dLi0(s)∑
k∈N0
dLik(s)
then dai0(s) ≥ 0. In particular, if ai0(s) ≤ δ then dai0(s) ≥ 0 (with
dai0(s) > 0 if ai0(s) < δ). Thus, by the same contradiction found in the case for j ∈ N ,
we are able to bound ai0(t) ≥ δ.
(iii) First, if i = 0 then
∑
j∈N0
a0j(t) = 1 by property that a0j(t) =
1
n1{j 6=0} for all times t.
Now consider i ∈ N , if Vi(t) ≥ 0 then by construction (and the above result) it follows
that
∑
j∈N0
aij(t) =
∑
j∈N0
dLij(t)∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
= 1. Consider now the case for Vi(t) < 0 and
let τ = sup{s ≤ t | Vi(s) = 0}. Since
∑
j∈N0
aij(τ) = 1 by prior results, we will assume
that
∑
j∈N0
aij(t) = 1 to deduce
∑
j∈N0
daij(t) =
∑
j∈N0
dLij(t)− aij(t)
∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
Vi(t)−
=
∑
j∈N0
dLij(t)
Vi(t)−
−
(∑
j∈N0
aij(t)
) (∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
)
Vi(t)−
= 0.
Therefore based on the initial conditions, aij(t) must evolve so that it maintains the
constant row sum of 1.
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Proof of Theorem 4.5. Recall that the initial values to the Eisenberg-Noe differential system are
Vi(0) > 0 and aij(0) =
dLij(0)∑
k∈N0
dLik(0)
1{i6=0} +
1
n1{i=0, j 6=0} for all banks i, j ∈ N0. For ease of
notation, consider τ0 := 0 and recursively define the stopping times
τm+1 := inf{t ∈ (τm, T ] | Vi(τm)Vi(t) < 0 or [Vi(τm) = 0, dVi(τm)Vi(t) < 0]}.
That is, τm ∈ T is the time of the mth change in Λ(V ). Without loss of generality, we will
assume that τm = T if the infimum is taken over an empty set. We note that the times τm are
all stopping times with respect to the natural filtration.
With these times, note that in particular, on the interval (τm, τm+1] we can consider the set
of distressed banks to be constant; to simplify, and slightly abuse, notation we can thus consider
a constant matrix of distressed firms Λ(τm) in the interval (τm, τm+1]. We will now construct
the unique strong solution forward in time over these time intervals, noting that we update Λ
and τm+1 once the next event is found.
First, by construction, on [0, τ1] there exists a unique solution to the differential system
provided by V (t) = V (0) + c(t) and aij(t) =
dLij(t)∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
1{i6=0} +
1
n1{i=0, j 6=0} for all banks
i, j ∈ N0. Assume there exists a strong solution in the time interval [0, τm] for τm < T . Now
we want to prove the existence and uniqueness for the clearing wealths and relative exposures
on the interval (τm, τm+1]. Expanding dc(t) based on its differential form allows us to consider
(12) as
dV (t) = [I −A(t)⊤Λ(τm)]−1(µ(t, c(t)) − [L˙(t)⊤ −A(t)⊤L˙(t)]~1)dt
+ [I −A(t)⊤Λ(τm)]−1σ(t, c(t))dW (t)
= µ¯(t, c(t), A(t), V (t))dt + σ¯(t, c(t), A(t), V (t))dW (t).
Let us first consider the linear growth condition for dV . Utilizing the 1-norm and where ‖ · ‖op1
denotes the corresponding operator norm, let A ∈ A and V ∈ Rn+1, then
‖µ¯(t, c, A, V )‖1 + ‖σ¯(t, c, A, V )‖op1
≤ ‖(I −A⊤Λ(τm))−1‖op1
(
‖µ(t, c)‖1 + ‖[L˙(t)⊤ −A⊤L˙(t)]~1‖1 + ‖σ(t, c)‖op1
)
≤
∞∑
k=0
‖[A⊤Λ(τm)]k‖op1
(
‖µ(t, c)‖1 + ‖L˙(t)⊤~1‖1 + ‖A⊤L˙(t)~1‖1 + ‖σ(t, c)‖op1
)
≤
(
1 +
∞∑
k=1
(1− δ)k−1
)(
‖µ(t, c)‖1 + ‖L˙(t)⊤~1‖1 + ‖A⊤‖op1 ‖L˙(t)~1‖1 + ‖σ(t, c)‖op1
)
≤
(
1 +
1
δ
)(
‖µ(t, c)‖1 + ‖[L˙(t)⊤~1‖1 + ‖L˙(t)~1‖1 + ‖σ(t, c)‖op1
)
≤ 1 + δ
δ
sup
s∈[τm,τm+1]
(
‖µ(s, c)‖1 + ‖L˙(s)⊤~1‖1 + ‖L˙(s)~1‖1 + ‖σ(s, c)‖op1
)
≤ θ(1 + ‖c‖1)
The second line follows from the triangle inequality and definition of the operator norm. The
third line is a result of Proposition B.1 and further use of the triangle inequality. The fourth
line follows from Proposition 4.4 and noting that, by assumption, Λ00 = 0. The upper bound
θ ≥ 0 can be determined by Assumption 4.1 and since all terms are continuous and being
evaluated on a compact interval of time (since τm+1 ≤ T by definition). Further, we wish to
prove µ¯ : T×Rn+1×A×Rn+1 → Rn+1 and σ¯ : T×Rn+1×A×Rn+1 → R(n+1)×(n+1) are jointly
locally Lipschitz in (c, A, V ). First (c, A, V ) ∈ Rn+1 × A× Rn+1 7→ µ(t, c) − [L˙(t)⊤ −A⊤L˙(t)]~1
and (c, A, V ) ∈ Rn+1×A×Rn+1 7→ σ(t, c) are Lipschitz continuous by their linear (or constant)
forms with Lipschitz constants that can be taken independently of time (via continuity and
the compact time domain) as well as the definitions of µ and σ. It remains to show that
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(c, A, V ) ∈ Rn+1 × A × Rn+1 7→ (I − A⊤Λ(τm))−1 is Lipschitz continuous. Let A,B ∈ A, then
by the same argument as above on the bounds of the norm of the matrix inverse,
‖(I −A⊤Λ(τm))−1 − (I −B⊤Λ(τm))−1‖op1
= ‖(I −A⊤Λ(τm))−1[(I −B⊤Λ(τm))− (I −A⊤Λ(τm))](I −B⊤Λ(τm))−1‖op1
= ‖(I −A⊤Λ(τm))−1[A−B]⊤Λ(τm)(I −B⊤Λ(τm))−1‖op1
≤ ‖(I −A⊤Λ(τm))−1‖op1 ‖(I −B⊤Λ(τm))−1‖op1 ‖Λ(τm)‖op1 ‖[A−B]⊤‖op1
≤
(
1 + δ
δ
)2
‖Λ(τm)‖op1 ‖A−B‖op∞
≤ n
(
1 + δ
δ
)2
‖Λ(τm)‖op1 ‖A−B‖op1 .
Thus µ¯ and σ¯ are appropriately locally Lipschitz continuous on [τm, τm+1].
Now we wish to consider the differential form for the relative exposures matrix (13). First,
if Λii(τm) = 0 (and in particular, Λ00(τm) = 0 by assumption of the societal node) then
aij(t) =
dLij(t)∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
1{i6=0} +
1
n1{i=0, j 6=0} is the unique solution for any firm j ∈ N0 over
all times t ∈ (τm, τm+1]. In particular, this is independent of the evolution of the wealths V ,
so we need only consider the joint differential equation between the wealths V and the relative
exposures aij where bank i is in distress between times τm and τm+1, i.e., Λii(τm) = 1. Consider
bank i ∈ N with Λii(τm) = 1. Therefore by construction Vi(t) < 0 for all t ∈ (τm, τm+1). If
Vi(τm+1) = 0 then from Proposition 4.4, it already follows that the unique solution aij(τm+1) =
dLij(τm+1)∑
k∈N0
dLik(τm+1)
must hold, otherwise we can extend Vi(t) < 0 for t ∈ (τm, τm+1]. The differ-
ential form for all relative exposures (13) on the interval (τm, τm+1] is provided by daij(t) =
dLij(t)−aij(t)
∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
Vi(t)−
. By construction (aij , Vi) ∈ [0, 1]× −R++ 7→ L˙ij(t)−aij
∑
k∈N0
L˙ik(t)
−Vi
is
locally Lipschitz and satisfies a local linear growth condition (with constants bounded indepen-
dent of time as above utilizing continuity of the parameters and the compact time domain).
Combining our results for the joint differential system for the cash flows c, clearing wealths
V from (12), and relative exposures A from (13), we find that this system satisfies a joint
local linear growth and local Lipschitz property on the interval (τm, τm+1]. Therefore, there
exists some ǫ ∈ L∞T (R++) (such that τm + ǫ is a stopping time) for which a strong solution for
(c, V, A) : [τm, τm+ ǫ]→ Rn+1×Rn+1×A exists and is unique. Using the same logic with local
properties, we can continue our unique strong solution sequentially. This can be continued until
the stopping time τm+1 is reached (found along the path of (c, V, A) as a stopping time) or this
process reaches some maximal time T ∗ < τm+1 for which a unique strong solution exists on the
time interval [τm, T
∗). First, as c(t) can be calculated separately from the clearing wealths and
relative exposures, we can immediately determine that c(T ∗) = limtրT∗ c(t) exists. Further, we
note that any solution V (t) must, almost surely, exist in the (almost surely) compact space[
V (τm)−
(
I +
1 + δ
δ
1
)(∫ t
τm
dc(s)− + (L(t)− L(τm))~1
)
, V (τm) + c(t)− c(τm)
]
⊆ L2t (Rn+1)
where 1 = {1}(n+1)×(n+1). The lower bound is determined to be based on the bounding of the
Leontief inverse; the upper bound follows from the continuous-time version of (15), i.e.,
V (t) = V (0) + c(t)−A(t)⊤V (t)−.
Additionally, aij(t) almost surely exists in the compact neighborhood [0, 1] by definition. There-
fore (V (T ∗), A(T ∗)) = limtրT∗(V (t), A(t)) exists by continuity of the solutions and compactness
of the range space. Thus we can continue the differential equation from time T ∗ with values
(c(T ∗), V (T ∗), A(T ∗)) which contradicts the nature that T ∗ is the maximal time. Notably, if
Vi(T
∗) = 0 for some bank i then it is imperative to check if τm+1 = T
∗ to update the set of
distressed banks Λ.
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Therefore, by induction, there exists a unique strong solution (V,A) to (12) and (13) on the
domain [0, τm] for any index m ∈ N by use of [36, Theorem 5.2.1]. In particular this holds up to
τ∗ = supm∈N τm. If τ
∗ ≥ T then the proof is complete. If τ∗ < T , then by the same argument
as above we can find (V (τ∗), A(τ∗)) as we can bound both the wealths and relative exposures
into an almost surely compact neighborhood (and a subset of L2τ∗(Rn+1)). Therefore, as before,
we can start the process again at time τ∗, which contradicts the terminal nature of τ∗. This
concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.9. Consider the dynamic Eisenberg-Noe systems as fixed point problems for
processes. That is, consider the fixed point problem (V,A) = (ΦV (∆t, V, A),ΦA(∆t, V, A)) for
∆t ≥ 0 where ΦV : R+ × (Rn+1)T ×AT → (Rn+1)T and ΦA : R+ × (Rn+1)T ×AT → AT defined
by
ΦV (∆t, A, V ) :=
(
V (−∆t) +
∫ t
0
dc(s)−A(t)⊤V (t)−
)
t∈T
Φaij (∆t, A, V ) :=




∫
t
t−∆t
dLij(s)+aij(t−∆t)Vi(t−∆t)
−
max{
∑
k∈N0
∫
t
t−∆t
dLik(s)+Vi(t−∆t)− , Vi(t)−}
1{i6=0}
+ 1n1{i=0, j 6=0}


t∈T
if ∆t > 0


[
dLij(t)∑
k∈N0
dLik(t)
1{i6=0} +
1
n1{i=0, j 6=0}
]
1{Vi(t)≥0}
+

 dLij(τ(t))∑k∈N0 dLik(τ(t))
+
∫ t
τ(t)
dLij(u)−aij(u)
∑
k∈N0
dLik(u)
Vi(u)−

 1{Vi(t)<0}


t∈T
if ∆t = 0
where τ(t) := sup{s < t | Vi(s) ≥ 0} is the last time that bank i was not in distress before time
t. Note that ΦV follows from the logic of (15) by expanding out the recursive formulation (7)
or differential systems (12). By construction
(ΦV (0, A, V ),ΦA(0, A, V )) = lim
∆tց0
(ΦV (∆t, A∆t, V∆t),ΦA(∆t, A∆t, V∆t))
for paths of convergent relative exposure matrices A∆t → A ∈ AT and wealths processes V∆t →
V ∈ (Rn+1)T (in the product topologies). Thus by the uniqueness of the discrete-time and
continuous-time clearing solutions (Corollary 4.2 and Theorem 4.5) and an application of [22,
Proposition A.2], the proof is completed.
Proposition B.1. For any relative exposure matrix A ∈ A and any distress matrix Λ ∈
{0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) such that Λ00 = 0 and Λij = 0 for i 6= j, the matrix I − A⊤Λ is invert-
ible with Leontief form, i.e., (I −A⊤Λ)−1 =∑∞k=0(A⊤Λ)k.
Proof. By inspection, for any A ∈ A, (I − A⊤Λ)(I + A⊤(I − ΛA⊤)−1Λ) = I, i.e., the form of
the inverse is provided by I + A⊤(I − ΛA⊤)−1Λ. We refer to [21, Theorem 2.6] for a detailed
proof that (I − ΛA⊤)−1 is nonsingular and is provided by the Leontief inverse. Therefore, by
construction
(I −A⊤Λ)−1 = (I +A⊤(I − ΛA⊤)−1Λ) = I +A⊤
(
∞∑
k=0
(ΛA⊤)k
)
Λ
= I +
∞∑
k=0
A⊤Λ(A⊤)kΛk = I +
∞∑
k=0
(A⊤Λ)k+1 =
∞∑
k=0
(A⊤Λ)k.
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